Once, while on an otherwise uneventful hike in British Columbia, my companion and I chanced to cross paths with a brown bear. It approached the trail through brush, breaking small branches along the way. I heard my companion say "Bear! Bear! Bear!" in a hushed but increasingly urgent tone. "I know," I said, "Let's just keep walking away from it at the same pace." Her utterance had not drawn my attention to the bear. It was a very large and not especially stealthy animal, so it already had my attention. But her words and my response established what psychologists call joint attention. We saw the bear together and, on the basis of our shared perception, we were able to take what turned out to be effective action.
Joint attention has recently garnered considerable interest among psychologists. Current research indicates that joint attention is uncommon among non-human animals, whereas humans typically begin to engage in some rudimentary form of joint attention at about the age of twelve months (Eilan, 2005) . Joint attention appears to play a crucial role in the acquisition of linguistic competence (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2005) , and it is clearly a basis for many cooperative activities. Some researchers have argued that joint attention episodes allow human beings to pool cognitive resources and thereby create speciesspecific features of human life such as natural languages and complex institutions (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003) . The psychological literature has not, however, succeeded in clarifying how persons jointly attend to an object. Focused on identifying developmental antecedents and consequences of joint attention, psychologists have not provided a satisfactory account of how perception can be shared.
Joint attention thus stands in need of phenomenological clarification. Surprisingly, this has yet to be offered. Phenomenologists have provided detailed analyses of perceptual experience, and, as Dan Zahavi has rightly asserted, no other philosophical tradition has been more concerned with the nature of intersubjectivity (2008, p. 148) . But phenomenological analyses of perception have focused on perceptual experiences of a single perceiver rather than on those of co-perceivers, and phenomenology of intersubjectivity has focused on how one person encounters other persons rather than on how one person perceptually attends to an object with others. This paper thus addresses a shortcoming of both contemporary psychological research and the tradition of phenomenology by offering a phenomenology of joint attention. The first section reviews elementary Husserlian phenomenology and introduces a system for symbolically representing the structure of intentional mental states. The second section summarizes Edith Stein's phenomenological description of empathy, the intentional mental state in which one is directly aware of other persons. The third section brings these resources to bear on the problem of joint attention. I begin by clarifying Alfred Schutz's analysis of the face-to-face situation, and then extend his analysis to cases involving a third element, a jointly perceived object. The final section considers and responds to a number of objections that might be brought against this analysis. Philosophy (1913 Philosophy ( /1983 , phenomenology is a theory of intentional mental states. A mental state is intentional insofar as it is about some object. The perceptual experience I have of my desktop fan is thus an intentional state, as is my appreciation of the beauty of a Klein bike frame or my judgment that the sum of two and three is five. In the Logical Investigations (1900-1901/2001 ) Husserl called these mental states "acts", but in Ideas he prefers to call them "noeses".
Husserlian Phenomenology

As Husserl explains in Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Every noesis has a number of distinct parts. The thetic character of a noesis is the part by virtue of which it falls into one or another psychological category such as perception, judgment, memory or imagination. Every noesis also has a noetic component, a part by virtue of which it is about an object. More precisely, this is the part by virtue of which a noesis is about an object under some description. On my otherwise uneventful hike in British Columbia, I did not see just an object. I saw an object as fitting the description "brown bear making its way toward the trail". I saw the object under this description by virtue of the noetic component of my perceptual act. Noeses of the same thetic character can have noetic components of different types, as is the case with perception of a desktop fan and perception of a Klein bike frame. Conversely, noeses with noetic components of the same type can differ in thetic character, as is the case with perception of an especially dry cappuccino and memory of an especially dry cappuccino.
Phenomenological theory uses noematic descriptions to identify the noetic components of intentional mental states. As explained above, the noetic component of a noesis is that part by virtue of which the noesis is about an object under some description. A noematic description identifies the noetic component by articulating the description under which the object falls. "Brown bear making its way toward the trail" would thus be a noematic description, as would "desktop fan", "Klein bike frame" and "especially dry cappuccino."
Linguistic expressions serving as noematic descriptions are intentional contexts. In such contexts neither existential generalization nor substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions necessarily preserves truth value. If I were to identify the noetic component of my act of imagination by saying "I imagine an especially dry cappuccino", it would not follow that there is an especially dry cappuccino. If I were to identify the noetic component of my perception by saying "I perceive the Klein bike frame" and, as a matter of fact, that bike frame is also the only piece of aluminium in the room, it would not follow that the noesis is about the only piece of aluminium in the room.
In Appendix XII to On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928 Time ( /1991 , Husserl uses symbolic expressions to represent the thetic character and noetic component of a noesis. He apparently found these expressions well-suited for clarifying the structure of extremely complex acts. Since perceiving an object with some other person proves to be an experience of considerable complexity, I will introduce Husserl's system for constructing these expressions here and employ this system in my analysis of joint attention in the third section. represents perception of a physical object. "P" shows that the noesis is a perception, "(o)" serves as a noematic description, and "o" abbreviates "physical object". It is possible to represent the structure of noeses of greater complexity by using additional parentheses and letters. The following expression, for example, represents remembering having perceived a physical object:
(2) M(P(o)).
"M" indicates that the noesis is an act of remembering, and "(P(o))" is the noematic description. Since the act of remembering is about a perceptual experience, the noematic description includes a thetic character letter, "P". The noematic description also includes "(o)", indicating that the remembered perception is of a physical object. There is no limit to the number of noematic descriptions that might, in this manner, be nested within some other noematic description. Thus, imagining remembering having perceived a physical object could be expressed by
In this case, the noematic description "(o)" is part of the noematic description "(P(o))", which is itself part of the noematic description of the act of imagining: Husserl's usual procedure is to begin with a noematic description of some phase of experience and work back to an account of constitutive noeses. It seems that, as Husserl became more practised in addressing functional problems, he became increasingly aware that the noematic description of some phase of experience often attributes more to the object of that phase than is, strictly speaking, presented in that phase. If the object of a perceptual experience falls under the description "coffee cup", this implies that the perceptual experience is of an object with an underside; but as I look at this object from above, this phase of my perceptual experience does not properly present that side (Husserl, 1907 (Husserl, /1997 . However, the underside of the object could be properly presented in another perceptual experience, one that I would have by lifting the object up and looking underneath. That possible noesis belongs to the horizon of the current phase of perceptual experience. Generally, the horizon of a noesis consists of all possible noeses such that one would remain conscious of the same object under the same description.
3
Empathy
The object of joint attention differs from other objects of perception insofar as it is perceived as a part of a broader situation that includes at least one other person who also perceives it. The intentional state in which one is aware of a jointly attended object must, therefore, include a noesis in which one is aware of another person as such (that is, a noesis in which one is aware of an object as falling under the description "person"). A detailed account of such awareness can be found in the early work of Husserl's assistant at Freiburg, Edith Stein.
3 This statement must be qualified. In the case of perceiving a coffee cup, I not only take the object to have an underside which is not presently properly perceived, but also to have a mark on the underside identifying its maker. I might not presently, though, take the object to have any particular mark on that side. If I were to pick up the cup and look at the underside, then I would properly perceive a particular mark. The description under which I perceive the object changes as that description becomes more determinate in the course of my experience. Yet, I continue to perceive the object as a coffee cup with a mark on the underside. The noematic descriptions of the two acts have this description in common. This common description is the description that remains unchanged in the course of the perceptions belonging to the horizon.
Unlike many contemporary cognitive psychologists, Stein maintains that it is possible to perceive other persons as such. It is not the case that one only perceives non-thinking, physical things and then infers that some of these things think in this way or that (perhaps on the basis of perceived similarities between one's own body and the bodies of others). When I observe someone walk into a room, my experience no more involves an inferential process than when I perceive a cup. Rather, I am noninferentially aware of someone who exists here and now and is engaged in an action, an intentional behaviour. This awareness of the other person thus merits being described as perceiving the other person.
4
When I see someone walk into a room, I perceive the body of the other person not merely as a Körper but as a Leib, as a lived body (Stein, 1917 (Stein, /1989 . Whereas the Körper or physical body shares features common to other physical objects (for instance, position in space and time, extension in three-dimensions, causal relation to other physical objects), the lived body, whether my own or that of another, is a sensory field, a zero-point of orientation, an expressive field, and self-moving. If I perceive someone's hand resting on a (1917/1989, p. 57) . 5 I experience the other person as having features to which there is first-person access, but I am not the subject for whom there is such access. Owing to this peculiarity of the noeses in which one is aware of another person as such, this sort of intentional mental state requires a term distinguishing it from perception of mere physical things. In keeping with the psychology of her day, Stein chose the term "Einfühlung", a term usually translated as "empathy".
6
As Stein notes, empathy belongs to the class of noeses which permit iteration (1917/1989, p. 18) . Remembering, reflecting and imagining also belong to this class. It is possible, for instance, to remember having remembered. It is likewise possible to 5 I would modify the English translation, reading "Konoriginarität" as "co-originarity" instead of "conprimordiality". 6 "Einfühlung" is a somewhat unfortunate term for the phenomenon in question. Transliterally, "Einfühlung" is "feeling-in", which suggests a process of imaginatively putting oneself into the place of the other. An analytically isolable moment of the face-to-face situation is the pure We-relationship. Schutz offers a series of increasingly precise accounts of the latter. He initially states that "The pure We-relationship is merely the reciprocal form of the pure Thouorientation, that is, the pure awareness of the presence of another person" (1932/1967, p. 168) . But shortly thereafter he writes that "The pure We-relationship involves an awareness of each other's presence and also the knowledge of each that the other is aware of him" (1932/1967, p. 168 And I will in turn take account of the fact that you are thus oriented to me, and this will influence both my intentions with respect to you and how I act toward you. This again you will see, I will see that you have seen it, and so on. This interlocking of glances, this thousandfaceted mirroring of each other, is one of the unique features of the face-to-face situation. We may say that it is a constitutive characteristic of this particular social relationship. (1932/1967, p. 170) In addition to first-and second-order empathy, Schutz claims that third-order and fourth-order empathy are also constitutive features of the face-to-face situation. As I am talking with another person in a face-to-face situation, I empathize with the other as empathizing with me. The other mirrors my second-order empathy in her third-order empathy, an act that includes a noetic component by virtue of which her empathy is about my second-order empathy. Her third-order empathy is mirrored by my fourth-order empathy. Schutz adds "and so on", indicating that still higher orders of empathy are constitutive of this relationship. Presumably, he means that the other, aware of my fourth-order empathy, mirrors this fourth-order act in her own fifth-order empathy; this is something of which I am aware, mirroring it in my own sixth-order empathy. Higher orders of empathy are constitutive of the face-to-face situation ad infinitum.
In order to present the constitution analysis of the pure We-relationship, I will make three additions to the system introduced in the first section of this paper for symbolically representing the structure of noeses. First, I will use subscripts to distinguish one's own noeses from the noeses of a person with whom one empathizes. Suppose that I empathize with another person whom I take to empathize with me insofar as I perceive a physical object. Using subscripts, the structure of this act is represented by (4) E 1 (E 2 (P 1 (o))).
"E 1 " indicates both that this is an act of empathy and that it is my act rather than the act of the other person. "E 2 " serves as the first part of the noematic description of my empathy and indicates that the object of my empathy is the other's empathy. The first part of the noematic description of the other's empathy, "P 1 ", indicates that the other empathizes with me insofar as I have some perceptual experience. The "(o)" that follows "P 1 " shows that the other person takes me to perceive a physical object. As a second addition to the system, I will say that one noematic description explicates another noematic description if and only if a noesis cannot have the latter description without also having the former description. Suppose, for instance, that I perceive a Klein bike frame. It is impossible for me or anyone else to perceive a Klein bike frame without perceiving a bike frame. This means that the noematic description "bike frame" explicates the noematic description "Klein bike frame". Finally, I will use "(N 1 )" to indicate that a noesis is self-referential. More precisely, "(N 1 )" indicates that the act with this noematic description is about the noesis represented by the whole expression in which "(N 1 )" appears. So understood, it may be expressed in English by "this noesis".
With these additions in place, I take myself to be in a pure We-relationship with some one other person just in case:
(5) E 1 (E 2 (N 1 )), where (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 ))) explicates (N 1 ).
(5) shows that my empathic act is about another person's empathy. Thus, (5) represents the structure of my second-order act of empathy. Since (N 1 ) is the noematic description of the other's empathy, the other's empathy is for my second-order empathy. Since (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 ))) explicates (N 1 ), the structure of my act of empathy may also be expressed by (6) E 1 (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 )))).
But, if (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 ))) explicates (N 1 ), then (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 )))))) explicates (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 )))). Thus, the structure of my act of empathy may also be expressed by (7) E 1 (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (E 1 (E 2 (N 1 )))))).
Explication may continue in this manner ad infinitum.
Since the noematic description in (6) explicates that of (5), and the noematic description in (7) explicates that of (6), it is not possible for my empathy to have the noematic description given in (5) unless it has the noematic description given in (7). Indeed, it is not possible for my empathy to have the noematic description given in (5) unless it has all of the noematic descriptions that might be generated by continued explication. The analysis therefore accommodates Schutz's description of the face-toface situation. It certainly involves thousand-faceted mirroring. Indeed, on the present analysis, that turns out to be an understatement. Notice, too, that the explication of the noematic description of my empathy is also the explication of the noematic description of the empathy that I attribute to the other. Thus, whenever I empathize with another person so that I attribute to the other an act of empathy for my own empathy, I take each of us to be in an intentional mental state that may be explicated to yield higher order acts of empathy without limit.
7
Schutz prefers to discuss examples of face-to-face situations in which participants engage in otheraffecting action (that is, action aimed at changing the intentional states of co-participants). A conversational partner engages in actions of this sort, as does a conductor leading members of an orchestra. 8 Focused on other-affecting action in the face-to-face situation, Schutz tends to overlook the fact that these situations involve additional, co-perceived objects. This has led critics such as David Carr to reject Schutz's analysis. According to Carr, "we" typically has to do with situations in which participants do something together, such as attending to an object in the 7 Eugen Fink seems to have explicitly noted this feature of the face-to-face situation. In discussion with Schutz, Fink remarks that "the experience of the Other involves a reciprocal relationship: in experiencing the Other I experience concurrently his experiencing of me. But this reciprocal relationship is, taken strictly, not only a simple running back and forth from myself to the Other and from the Other to me. This reciprocal relationship allows, potentially, infinite reiteration. I can therefore say that I so experience the Other as he is experiencing me, and that he so experiences me as I am experiencing him, and this can go on infinitely. This potentiality need not be actualized; however, we have here an infinite reciprocal reflectibility somewhat like two mirrors placed one opposite the other reflecting into each other in infinite reiteration" (Fink, in Schutz, 1970, p. 85) . 8 Schutz deals with the latter case at some length in "Making Music Together" (1951/1964a).
perceptual field of each participant. Carr regards this third element, the object co-intended by participants, as a necessary condition of the pure We-relationship.
Comprising two or more subjectivities, it requires a third thing, the common object, in order to come into being. ... Schutz's description suggests a staring match or perhaps lovers gazing deep into each other's eyes. But in a staring match the other disappears as other, and lovers who do not get on to other things besides gazing will not have much of an affair. (Carr, 1983, p. 267) According to Carr, Schutz mischaracterizes the pure We-relationship precisely insofar as he leaves out the third element.
Carr's criticism is somewhat unfair, since the pure We-relationship is supposed to be an analytically isolable part of a more complex phenomenon. That is the point of calling it "pure". Schutz stresses, for instance, that persons are never aware of each other simply as persons, but always under culturally and historically specific descriptions such as "professor", "mail carrier" or "New Yorker". He would also have accepted that face-to-face situations involve shared intentional states about a third element. Carr is correct, however, that Schutz's account of triadic intentional systems (that is, face-to-face situations including a third element) is underdeveloped.
Lack of attention to these systems is odd considering that Schutz's first example of a face-to-face situation explicitly involves a jointly perceived object:
Suppose that you and I are watching a bird in flight. The thought "bird-in-flight" is in each of our minds and is the means by which each of us interprets his own observations. Neither of us, however, could say whether our lived experiences on that occasion were identical. In fact, neither of us would even try to answer that question, since one's own subjective meaning can never be laid side by side with another's and compared. Nevertheless, during the flight of the bird you and I have "grown older together", our experiences have been simultaneous. Perhaps while following the bird's flight I noticed out of the corner of my eye that your head was moving in the same direction as mine. I could then say that the two of us, that we, had watched the bird's flight. What I have done in this case is to co-ordinate temporally a series of my own experiences with a series of yours. But in doing so I do not go beyond the assertion of a mere general correspondence between my perceived "bird-in-flight" and your experiences. I make no pretence to any knowledge of the content of your subjective experiences or of the particular way in which they were structured. It is enough for me to know that you are a fellow human being who was watching the same thing that I was. And if you have in a similar way coordinated my experiences with yours, then we can both say that we have seen a bird in flight. (Schutz, 1932 (Schutz, /1967 In this example, I see the bird in flight and notice that another person also perceives the bird in flight. This means that I empathize with the other. Empathizing with the other, I take her to likewise notice that I perceive the bird in flight. Thus,
But, in light of what Schutz goes on to say about the constitutive features of the face-to-face situation, (8) cannot be an adequate analysis. If co-perception of the bird in flight occurs in a face-to-face situation, then it must involve a pure We-relationship. The analysis of joint perceptual attention to the bird in flight must somehow incorporate the analysis of the pure We-relationship offered in (5). This may be accomplished as follows:
In that case, the structure of the total phase of my experience may be represented by
This, in turn, may be represented by
And so on. This suggests the following analysis of joint attention with one other person. Letting "( )"
9 The recurrence of (b) in the conjuncts of (8) does not infer that the noematic descriptions of the two perceptions are completely identical. A noematic description of either perception would include description of features of the object which are only perceivable from the perspective of one perceiver at a time. Since two perceivers take up different perspectives at the same time, the complete noematic descriptions of their perceptions must differ. There may, nonetheless, be a core that they have in common, and (b) stands for this core description. 10 For explanation of symbols, see my discussion of (4) - (7) above (p. 6).
serve as a variable taking noematic descriptions of the perceptual acts as values, consciousness of an object of joint attention is constituted by:
(12) P 1 ( ) & E 1 (P 2 ( ) & E 2 (N 1 )), where (P 1 ( ) & E 1 (P 2 ( ) & E 2 (N 1 ))) explicates (N 1 ).
Objections
A critic might raise a number of objections to the proposed constitution analysis of joint attention. Of these possible objections, two strike me as most serious: (a) the analysis is incompatible with finite human cognitive powers; and (b) the analysis is unnecessarily complex.
Objection (a)
While it is plausible to suggest that human beings are capable of second-, third-and even fourth-order empathy, it may not seem plausible that we are capable of hundredth-order acts of empathy, let alone empathic acts of an infinite order. But, on the present analysis, all parties to joint attention have such intentional states, and, since joint attention is a pervasive, everyday phenomenon, intentional states of an infinite order must likewise be pervasive, everyday intentional states.
Schutz appears to have anticipated an objection along these lines. Immediately following the passage in which he discusses thousand-faceted mirroring in the face-to-face situation, he notes that we must remember that this pure Werelationship, which is the very form of every encounter with another person, is not itself grasped reflectively within the faceto-face situation. Instead of being observed, it is lived through. The many different mirror images of Self within Self are not therefore caught sight of one by one but are experienced as a continuum within a single experience. (1932/1967, p. 170) It is one thing to undergo a phase of experience consisting of some intentional mental states, and another to reflect upon that phase of experience and thereby distinguish each of the states and their parts. The claim that (12) represents the structure of the experience of joint attention does not imply that persons jointly attending to an object are aware, in reflection, of each of the infinitely many components of their intentional states. That sort of reflective awareness is indeed impossible.
Furthermore, if Husserl is right, then one has an intentional state of an infinite order whenever one is aware of the duration of one's own experience.
According to Husserl's well-known account of the consciousness of internal time, one is always aware of that which is immediately present, that which is now. But this awareness of the immediately present is a dependent part of a more complex intentional state, a state that includes both awareness of that which has just occurred and awareness of that which is about to occur. In Husserl's terms, awareness of that which is now is a dependent part of an intentional state including both retention of that which has been and protention of that which will be. Retention, more precisely, is retention of the intentional state of the preceding moment. That state had included awareness of that which was immediately present relative to it, as well as its own moments of retention and protention. This means that the moment of retention of one's present intentional state is about the moment of retention of the immediately preceding intentional state. Any retention has this feature. Thus, the moment of retention belonging to awareness of the present is about a moment of retention which is itself about a moment of retention. The latter is also about another moment of retention, and so on. This explains why Husserl claimed that any temporally extended phase of experience is a continuum of continua (1928/ 1991, p. 341 
Objection (b)
Even if it is possible for persons to have intentional states of the structure of (12), the proposed analysis might seem unnecessarily complex. While second-or even third-order empathy might very well be constitutive of joint attention, it might appear that empathic acts of higher order are not.
But, as Christopher Peacocke (2005) points out, I
jointly attend to an object with some other person only if I take the other person to jointly attend to that object with me. It is safe to assume that I take myself to jointly attend to an object with some other person only if I am aware that each of us empathizes with the other. This means that I must have second-order empathy about the other's first-order empathy. If second-order empathy is required for me to jointly attend to an object with the other, then the other must likewise have second-order empathy in order to jointly attend to that object with me. If I jointly attend to an object with some other person only on the condition that I am aware that the other jointly attends to that object with me, then I must be aware of the other's second-order empathy. This means that I must have third-order empathy for the other's second-order empathy. By parity of reasoning, the other must likewise be aware of my second-order empathy. I must be aware of this, and so forth. In short, if I jointly attend to an object with some other person only if I take the other to jointly attend to the object with me, then there is no upper limit to the order of empathy constitutive of joint attention.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to address a shortcoming common to both contemporary psychology and the phenomenological tradition: lack of an analysis of joint attention. Making use of resources provided by Husserl, Stein, and Schutz, I have argued that consciousness of a jointly perceived object has the following structure: P 1 ( ) & E 1 (P 2 ( ) & E 2 (N 1 )), where (P 1 ( ) & E 1 (P 2 ( ) & E 2 (N 1 ))) explicates (N 1 ).
The object of perception in a case of joint attention is grasped as part of a broader situation. 
